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CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRING SAFEGUARDS: 
LIMITATIONS ON THE APPLICATION OF  
THE CATEGORICAL APPROACH IN  
HERNANDEZ-ZAVALA v. LYNCH 
Abstract: On November 20, 2015, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
in Hernandez-Zavala v. Lynch held that adjudicators deciding whether a noncitizen 
has been convicted of a crime of domestic violence as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 
1227(a)(2)(E)(i) must apply the circumstance-specific approach to the statute’s 
domestic relationship requirement. In so doing, the Fourth Circuit carved out an 
exception to the more protective categorical and modified categorical approaches, 
which limit the evidence that may be admitted to determine whether a conviction 
triggers immigration consequences. This Comment argues that the Fourth Circuit 
erred in extending the circumstance-specific approach to crimes of domestic vio-
lence under the Immigration and Nationality Act, given the unique historical legacy 
of the categorical approach in immigration proceedings and the procedural disad-
vantages to which noncitizens in removal proceedings are subjected. 
INTRODUCTION 
Throughout the history of the United States, immigration and deportation 
have been divisive political issues.1 Political leaders on both sides of the aisle, 
however, generally support the removal of immigrants with prior criminal con-
victions.2 This population, though seen by many as unsympathetic and unde-
serving of immigration benefits, includes refugees, lawful permanent residents, 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See generally DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN HISTO-
RY (2007) (exploring the history of deportation in the United States); PETER SCHRAG, NOT FIT FOR 
OUR SOCIETY: IMMIGRATION AND NATIVISM IN AMERICA (2010) (discussing three centuries of anti-
immigrant sentiment in the United States). 
 2 See, e.g., Hillary Clinton, Remarks on Plan to Strengthen Immigrant Families at the National 
Immigrant Integration Conference in Brooklyn, HILARY FOR AMERICA (Jan. 31, 2016), https://
www.hillaryclinton.com/speeches/remarks-plan-strengthen-immigrant-families-national-immigrant-
integration-conference-brooklyn/ [https://perma.cc/7XBL-LYGP] (supporting the deportation of 
“dangerous criminals”); Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Immi-
gration, OBAMA WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES (Nov. 20, 2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2014/11/20/remarks-president-address-nation-immigration [https://perma.cc/SKV9-LBCH] 
(promoting the deportation of “[f]elons, not families” and “[c]riminals, not children”); Donald Trump, 
Remarks by President Trump in Joint Address to Congress (Feb. 28, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.
gov/the-press-office/2017/02/28/remarks-president-trump-joint-address-congress [https://perma.cc/
M2F3-545N] (recounting stories of violent crimes committed by undocumented immigrants). 
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and undocumented individuals, many of whom have lived in the United States 
for decades and are the parents of children with U.S. citizenship.3 
This Comment focuses on one provision of the Immigration and National-
ity Act (“INA”) which makes those who have committed “crimes of domestic 
violence” removable and ineligible for certain forms of discretionary relief.4 In 
November 2015, in Hernandez-Zavala v. Lynch, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit held that when analyzing whether a noncitizen’s conviction 
for a “crime of domestic violence” triggers immigration consequences, immi-
gration adjudicators should consider the underlying facts of the conviction us-
ing a “circumstance-specific approach.”5 Part I of this Comment provides an 
overview of the competing approaches to determining immigration conse-
quences of criminal convictions and the facts and procedural history of Her-
nandez-Zavala.6 Part II discusses the current state of the law with respect to 
“crimes of domestic violence” as defined in the INA.7 Part III argues that the 
Fourth Circuit failed to sufficiently consider the unique need for analytic and 
evidentiary limits in determining immigration consequences of criminal con-
victions, particularly considering the numerous procedural hurdles faced by 
immigrants in removal proceedings.8 
                                                                                                                           
 3 See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, FORCED APART: FAMILIES SEPARATED AND IMMI-
GRANTS HARMED BY UNITED STATES DEPORTATION POLICY (2007) (recounting the stories of perma-
nent residents and undocumented parents of U.S. citizens deported for having committed crimes); 
LEITNER CTR. FOR INT’L LAW & JUSTICE AT FORDHAM LAW SCH., REMOVING REFUGEES: U.S. DE-
PORTATION POLICY AND THE CAMBODIAN-AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2010) (documenting the experi-
ences of deported Cambodians, many of whom came to the United States as refugees and were de-
ported in the early 2000s as a result of criminal convictions); 2014 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, 
Table 41: Aliens Removed by Criminal Status and Region and Country of Nationality: Fiscal Year 
2014, HOMELAND SECURITY, https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2014/table41 
[https://perma.cc/4HWN-N4X3] (last visited Apr. 18, 2017) (noting a total of 167,740 removals in 
2014 of individuals with prior criminal convictions). 
 4 See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) (2012) (listing “crimes of domestic violence” as a removal 
ground); id. § 1229b(b)(1)(C) (stating that nonpermanent residents who have been convicted of crimes 
listed under § 1227(a)(2) are ineligible for relief in the form of cancellation of removal for certain 
nonpermanent residents); see also infra notes 46–49 and accompanying text (discussing the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act (“INA”) definition of “crimes of domestic violence” under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(E)(i)). 
 5 Hernandez-Zavala v. Lynch, 806 F.3d 259, 266–67 (4th Cir. 2015); see infra notes 58–65 and 
accompanying text (discussing the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning in Hernandez-Zavala). 
 6 See infra notes 9–54 and accompanying text. 
 7 See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i); infra notes 55–74 and accompanying text. 
 8 See infra notes 75–95 and accompanying text. 
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I. IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS: THE 
CATEGORICAL AND CIRCUMSTANCE-SPECIFIC APPROACHES 
For centuries, criminal convictions have impacted the ability of foreign 
nationals to immigrate to and remain in the United States.9 A dramatic shift 
occurred in the 1980s and 1990s, when a series of immigration reforms ex-
panded conviction categories predicating immigration consequences and in-
creased the severity of these consequences, resulting in increased numbers of 
deportations based on criminal convictions.10 With the passage of the Antiter-
rorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) and the Illegal Immigra-
tion Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”) in 1996, as part of 
an effort to protect public safety and address fears of “criminal aliens,” Con-
gress included for the first time “crimes of domestic violence” as a ground of 
removability under the INA.11 Section A of this Part discusses the development 
of the categorical approach to determine whether crimes qualify as those de-
                                                                                                                           
 9 See Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084 (1891) (including for the first time “crimes 
involving moral turpitude” as a ground for exclusion); CÉSAR CUAUHTÉMOC GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, 
CRIMMIGRATION LAW 4 (2015) (tracing the origins of “crimmigration” law to 1788, when Congress 
encouraged states to restrict the immigration of convicts); Julia Ann Simon-Kerr, Moral Turpitude, 
2012 UTAH L. REV. 1001, 1044–46 (noting that the adoption of “crimes involving moral turpitude” as 
a ground of exclusion in the Act of 1891 built upon the historic usage of the moral turpitude standard 
to perpetuate discriminatory policies such as disenfranchisement). 
 10 See, e.g., Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-
132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.) (expanding the list 
of “aggravated felony” offenses and eliminating judicial review of certain final removal orders based 
on criminal convictions); The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 
(“IIRIRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-546 (1996) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.) (expanding the list of “aggravated felony” offenses and the immigra-
tion consequences of certain criminal convictions to include mandatory detention and expedited re-
moval); Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4180, 4469–71 (1988) (codified as 
amended in 8 U.S.C. § 1101) (creating a new category of “aggravated felony” offenses, which result 
in the most serious immigration consequences); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 3, at 38 
(showing a steady increase in deportations based on criminal convictions from 1996 through 2005); 
Daniel Kanstroom, “Passed Beyond Our Aid:” U.S. Deportation, Integrity, and the Rule of Law, 35 
FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF., no. 2, 2011, at 95, 95–96 (exploring the political climate leading up to the 
1996 immigration amendments and the various ways in which AEDPA and IIRIRA transformed im-
migration law). 
 11 See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i); IIRIRA § 350(a), 110 Stat. at 3009-639 to 640 (1996). While 
“crimes of violence” resulting in a specified minimum sentence were already included within the 
INA’s list of “aggravated felony” offenses prior to 1996, the 1996 laws provided that convictions for 
“crimes of domestic violence” can result in immigration consequences even when no criminal sen-
tence is imposed. See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990) (expanding 
the definition of “aggravated felony” to include “crimes of violence” resulting in at least five-year 
sentences); IIRIRA § 350(a), 110 Stat. at 3009-639 to 640 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1227) 
(creating a new category of domestic violence predicate offenses); see also Linda Kelly, Domestic 
Violence Survivors: Surviving the Beatings of 1996, 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 303, 316 (1997) (critiquing 
domestic violence immigration laws enacted in the 1990s and the ways in which survivors are nega-
tively impacted by requirements that abusers face deportation). 
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scribed in the INA.12 Section B examines the more recent development of the 
circumstance-specific approach, with particular attention to “crimes of domes-
tic violence.”13 Section C discusses the facts and procedural history of Her-
nandez-Zavala.14 
A. The Categorical Approach 
For as long as U.S. law has imposed immigration consequences on indi-
viduals with criminal convictions, adjudicators have been faced with the chal-
lenge of developing analytic approaches and evidentiary guidelines to deter-
mine whether convictions under a variety of state and federal penal codes qual-
ify as crimes outlined in the INA.15 In portions of the INA that lay out the 
grounds of inadmissibility and deportability, the statute lists both categories of 
generic crimes and crimes defined in other sections of the United States 
Code.16 In determining whether a past conviction under a state or federal crim-
inal statute falls within one of these categories, Courts have generally adopted 
the “categorical approach,” which requires a comparison of the elements of the 
crime for which the respondent was convicted and the crime listed in the INA 
to determine whether the respondent’s conviction triggers immigration conse-
quences.17 In other words, the noncitizen’s underlying conduct is irrelevant in 
                                                                                                                           
 12 See infra notes 15–28 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 29–40 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 41–54 and accompanying text. 
 15 See Alina Das, The Immigration Penalties of Criminal Convictions: Resurrecting Categorical 
Analysis in Immigration Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1669, 1673–74 (2011) (analyzing the history of how 
adjudicators have determined immigration consequences of criminal convictions); Simon-Kerr, supra 
note 9, at 1046–47 (analyzing the ways in which adjudicators have struggled to establish workable 
standards to determine whether convictions satisfy immigration law’s undefined moral turpitude 
standard). 
 16 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(2), 1227(a)(2). Sections 212(a)(2) and 237(a)(2) of the INA (8 U.S.C. 
§§ 1182(a)(2), 1227(a)(2)) provide lists of crimes and establish that respondents convicted of these 
crimes are inadmissible and/or removable. Id. For some crimes, the INA references definitions contained 
in other federal statutory provisions, while for others it uses generic terms without providing any defini-
tion. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) (including within the list of “aggravated felony” offenses those 
illicit trafficking offenses “defined in section 802 of Title 21”), with 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A) (includ-
ing “murder”—a generic crime—in the list of “aggravated felony” offenses). Both federal and state con-
victions may qualify as grounds of removability or inadmissibility, and since immigration law first in-
cluded such provisions, adjudicators have struggled to account for the variety in criminal statutes, many 
of which are broader or narrower than those referenced in the INA. See Das, supra note 15, at 1673–74. 
 17 See Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1986 n.3, 1988 (2015) (applying the categorical ap-
proach to determine whether the respondent’s conviction for drug paraphernalia possession qualified 
as a controlled substance deportable offense by comparing the controlled substances listed under a 
state schedule with those listed under the federal schedule referenced in the INA—21 U.S.C. § 802 
(2012)); Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1684 (2013) (applying the categorical approach to 
determine whether the respondent’s conviction for possession with intent to distribute marijuana qual-
ified as an aggravated felony deportable offense by comparing the federal offense listed in the INA—
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)—with the state statute). Convictions under state or federal law may trigger immi-
gration consequences if the statute of conviction is either directly referenced in the INA or criminaliz-
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this analysis, and courts compare only the elements of the statute of conviction 
against the elements of the federal statute.18 Under the categorical approach, if 
a criminal statute is overbroad and could criminalize conduct that would not 
satisfy the elements of the INA-listed offense, a conviction under that statute 
would not trigger immigration consequences, regardless of the respondent’s 
actual conduct.19 
Immigration adjudicators have used some form of the categorical ap-
proach since the early 1900s.20 Federal judges deciding immigration cases dur-
ing this period concluded that in drafting national immigration policies, Con-
gress intended to limit the power of administrative immigration adjudicators.21 
                                                                                                                           
es the same or a narrower range of conduct than a specific or generic crime listed in the INA. See 
Jennifer Lee Koh, The Whole Better Than the Sum: A Case for the Categorical Approach to Deter-
mining the Immigration Consequences of Crime, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 257, 260 (2012) (explaining 
the process used to determine if a state conviction qualifies as a crime listed in the INA). For example, 
if a noncitizen is charged with having been convicted of an aggravated felony related to child pornog-
raphy under INA § 101(a)(43)(I), the noncitizen must have either been convicted under one of the 
specific provisions of 18 U.S.C. listed in the relevant section of the INA (18 U.S.C. §§ 2251, 2251A, 
or 2252) or have been convicted under a state law which is a categorical match for the relevant provi-
sions of Title 18. Id. 
 18 See Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1684, 1697 (explaining that under the categorical approach, a 
respondent’s actual conduct resulting in a criminal conviction is irrelevant). 
 19 See Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1988 (holding that the petitioner’s conviction for possession of drug 
paraphernalia was not categorically a controlled substance offense as defined in the INA because the 
statute of conviction criminalized the possession of paraphernalia relating to substances not included 
in the federal controlled substances schedules); Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2282–83 
(2013) (holding that the petitioner had not committed the generic crime of burglary because the statute 
under which he was convicted did not require breaking and entering, which is an element of the gener-
ic definition of burglary); Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1684, 1701 (holding that the petitioner’s convic-
tion for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute was not categorically an aggravated felony 
because the state statute under which the petitioner was convicted criminalized the sharing of small 
amounts of marijuana, conduct which would not result in a conviction under the relevant federal stat-
ute). Under the categorical approach, when the INA does not provide a definition for a crime, adjudi-
cators must identify the elements of the “offense as commonly understood.” Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 
2281. 
 20 See Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084 (listing categories of predicate crimes trigger-
ing inadmissibility); Das, supra note 15, at 1689 (describing the early history of the categorical ap-
proach). The development of the categorical approach in the immigration context can be traced to the 
early 1900s, not long after crimes involving moral turpitude were first included in the federal immi-
gration code as a ground of inadmissibility. Das, supra note 15, at 1689. Scholars have argued that 
this history is generally overlooked, which has enabled adjudicators to carve out a growing number of 
exceptions to the categorical approach. Id.; see also Simon-Kerr, supra note 9, at 1046–47 (arguing 
that the categorical approach developed as a result of the lack of a clear definition for the term “moral 
turpitude” in early immigration statutes, and adjudicators’ hesitance to reach fact-dependent conclu-
sions regarding the morality of respondents’ conduct). 
 21 See United States ex rel. Mylius v. Uhl, 203 F. 152, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1913); Das, supra note 15, 
at 1690, 1695–96. The District Court for the Southern District of New York reasoned in United States 
ex rel. Mylius v. Uhl in 1913 that the categorical approach is necessary for deciding immigration cases 
because of the administrative (as opposed to judicial) role of immigration adjudicators, the need for 
“definite standards” and “general rules,” and the importance of applying immigration law in a uniform 
manner. 203 F. at 153. A subsequent decision by Attorney General Cummings adopted the reasoning 
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The categorical approach was thus viewed as a way to ensure that immigration 
law is applied in a fair and uniform manner, and that determinations of guilt or 
innocence are restricted to Article III judges.22 
Despite this lengthy history, current interpretations of the categorical ap-
proach are based largely on non-immigration cases, including the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s 1990 decision in Taylor v. United States and subsequent cases 
employing the categorical approach to determine whether a prior conviction 
triggers a sentencing enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act 
(“ACCA”).23 In Taylor, the Court held that the prior burglary convictions of a 
                                                                                                                           
of Uhl as justification for use of the categorical approach. See Immigration Laws—Offenses Involving 
Moral Turpitude, 37 Op. Att’y Gen. 293, 294–95 (1933); Das, supra note 15, at 1695–96. But see 
Simon-Kerr, supra note 9, at 1048, 1058 (suggesting that despite these early judicial decisions adopt-
ing the categorical approach, Congress likely actually intended for adjudicators to examine the facts of 
individual cases to determine whether convictions were for crimes involving moral turpitude). 
 22 See U.S. Const. art. III, § 1 (establishing Article III judges); United States ex rel. Guarino v. 
Uhl, 107 F.2d 399, 400 (2d Cir. 1939) (stating that the respondent could only be deported if he were 
found to have been convicted of a crime that was “inherently” or “necessarily” immoral, and implying 
that under-inclusivity is preferable considering the “dreadful penalty of banishment”); Howes v. 
Tozer, 3 F.2d 849, 852 (1st Cir. 1925) (stating that by including the language “convicted” and “ad-
mits” in the immigration statute, Congress prevented immigration adjudicators from deciding whether 
the respondent was actually guilty or innocent of the crime of which he was convicted or admitted to 
having committed); Das, supra note 15, at 1690. The categorical approach prevents respondents from 
being subjected to “minitrials” by administrative judges to determine the facts behind convictions, and 
thereby facing removal based on alleged conduct rather than convictions. See Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct at 
1690 (“The categorical approach serves ‘practical’ purposes: It promotes judicial and administrative 
efficiency by precluding the relitigation of past convictions in minitrials conducted long after the 
fact.”). Given the lack of the procedural safeguards in removal proceedings that are guaranteed by the 
Constitution to criminal defendants, such as legal representation, trial by jury, and evidentiary limits, 
the categorical approach is an important limitation on the power of administrative judges to look be-
hind a conviction at a respondent’s underlying conduct. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (establishing 
protections against unreasonable seizures); id. amend. VI (establishing the right to trial by jury, to 
confront one’s accuser, and to counsel); id. amend. VIII (establishing protections against cruel and 
unusual punishment); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893) (declaring that “[t]he 
order of deportation is not a punishment for crime” and “the provisions of the constitution, securing 
the right of trial by jury, and prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures and cruel and unusual 
punishments, have no application”). See generally Kevin R. Johnson, An Immigration Gideon for 
Lawful Permanent Residents, 122 YALE L. J. 2394 (2013) (noting that the guaranteed right to counsel 
in criminal proceedings does not extend to removal proceedings, and arguing that courts should rec-
ognize lawful permanent residents’ due process right to counsel). 
 23 See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2012) (imposing sentencing enhancements on those convicted of a 
firearms possession or transportation offense under § 922(g) who have prior violent felony or drug 
offense convictions); Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1697 (citing Taylor as the basis for the Court’s defini-
tion of the categorical approach); Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990) (using the cate-
gorical approach to determine whether a burglary conviction qualified as a predicate offense trigger-
ing a sentencing enhancement for a felon in possession of a firearm conviction). The categorical ap-
proach has developed in a number of contexts under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”). See 
Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2248–50 (2016) (burglary); Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2281 
(burglary); Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 144 (2010) (simple battery); Chambers v. United 
States, 555 U.S. 122, 123–25 (2009) (failure to report for penal confinement); Shepard v. United 
States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005) (burglary). This more recent development of the categorical approach 
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defendant charged as a felon in possession of a firearm resulted in a sentence 
enhancement under the ACCA because the state burglary statute contained all 
the elements of the modern generic crime of burglary.24 Recent cases drawing 
on the Taylor Court’s reasoning have led to the refinement of what is known as 
the “modified categorical approach.”25 This variation on the categorical ap-
proach provides adjudicators with a means of analyzing convictions under “di-
visible” statutes containing multiple alternative elements.26 In such situations, 
adjudicators are permitted to consult limited sources within the record of con-
viction to determine under which version of the statute a respondent was con-
victed.27 If the respondent was convicted under a version of the statute that 
aligns with the predicate crime listed in the INA, the underlying conviction 
may trigger immigration consequences, notwithstanding the overbreadth of the 
statute of conviction as a whole.28 
                                                                                                                           
in the criminal sentencing context is based on similar, but slightly different rationales than in the im-
migration context. See Shepard, 544 U.S. at 24 (concluding that the categorical approach protects 
defendants’ Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial); Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600–02 (justifying adoption of 
the categorical approach due to statutory interpretation, legislative history, and “the practical difficul-
ties and potential unfairness” of inquiries into the facts behind a conviction, particularly where a re-
spondent entered a guilty plea). 
 24 See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 598, 602. In Taylor, the Court measured the defendant’s state convic-
tion against the generic definition of burglary because the ACCA failed to define burglary. Id. The 
Court examined the traditional common law definition of burglary as well as the definition contained 
in the Model Penal Code and other statutes. Id. at 580. Through a thorough analysis of the various 
definitions of burglary and the legislative history of the Model Penal Code and the ACCA, the Court 
applied the definition of burglary as adopted by most states. Id. at 598. 
 25 See Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2249 (clarifying when the modified categorical approach may be 
used); Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2285 (recognizing but not applying the modified categorical ap-
proach); Shepard, 544 U.S. at 26 (listing the documents within the record of conviction that courts 
later determined are all that may be consulted when analyzing a conviction using the modified cate-
gorical approach). 
 26 See Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2249; Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2285. As the Supreme Court explained 
in Descamps in 2013, the modified categorical approach is not actually a separate approach to deter-
mining immigration consequences of criminal convictions, but rather a tool that enables adjudicators 
to continue utilizing the categorical approach in situations involving divisible statutes. Descamps, 133 
S. Ct. at 2285. 
 27 See Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2252–53 (clarifying that the modified categorical approach may only 
be applied when a statute contains “multiple alternative elements”); Shepard, 544 U.S. at 26 (limiting 
the sources that may be consulted when a statute is found to be divisible to the record of conviction); 
Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602 (creating an exception to the categorical approach where a jury was “actually 
required to find all the elements” of the generic offense). 
 28 See, e.g., Ibarra-Hernandez v. Holder, 770 F.3d 1280, 1282 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding that the 
noncitizen’s conviction for taking the identity of another qualified as a crime involving moral turpi-
tude even though the statute was overbroad, because he had been convicted under a version of the 
statute necessarily involving fraud); Kaufmann v. Holder, 759 F.3d 6, 8–9 (1st Cir. 2014) (finding that 
a child pornography conviction under a statute containing multiple alternative elements qualified as an 
aggravated felony even though the statute was overbroad, because the noncitizen had been convicted 
under a version of the statute which was a categorical match to the offense listed in the INA). The 
modified categorical approach allows a prior state conviction under a divisible statute with multiple 
alternative elements to trigger immigration consequences when the record of conviction makes clear 
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B. The Circumstance-Specific Approach 
As guidelines for applying the categorical and modified categorical ap-
proaches have gradually developed, a recent line of cases has emerged carving 
out exceptions to these approaches.29 Where requirements of offenses listed in 
the INA appear to describe the particular circumstances under which a nonciti-
zen committed a crime, rather than elements of the crime, courts have ap-
proved the use of the “circumstance-specific approach.”30 This new alternative 
to the categorical approach permits adjudicators to examine any evidence that 
would otherwise be admissible in immigration court to determine whether the 
facts underlying a criminal conviction satisfy the requirements of the INA of-
fense.31 Under the circumstance-specific approach, therefore, a conviction may 
trigger an immigration consequence even if the statute under which the re-
spondent was convicted is overbroad and indivisible.32 
                                                                                                                           
that the respondent was convicted under the version of the statute that is a categorical match for the 
crime listed in the INA. See Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2252–53 (explaining how the modified categorical 
approach functions). Under both the categorical and modified categorical approaches, however, the 
inquiry made by the adjudicator is whether the respondent was convicted under a statute aligning with 
a crime listed in the INA, rather than whether the facts underlying the conviction should trigger immi-
gration consequences. See Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2285 (describing the modified categorical ap-
proach as a tool used to engage in a categorical analysis involving a divisible statute of conviction). 
 29 See, e.g., Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 36 (2009) (holding that the categorical approach 
does not apply to a monetary threshold requirement for fraud crimes); Garcia-Hernandez v. Boente, 
847 F.3d 869, 872 (7th Cir. 2017) (holding that the categorical approach does not apply to protection 
order violations); In re Garza-Olivares, 26 I. & N. Dec. 736, 738–39 (B.I.A. 2016) (holding that the 
categorical approach does not apply to certain requirements of crimes of failure to appear); In re 
Dominguez-Rodriguez, 26 I. & N. Dec. 408, 411 (B.I.A. 2014) (holding that the categorical approach 
does not apply to the issue of whether a drug offense was merely “possession for personal use”); see 
also Das, supra note 15, at 1712–18 (explaining the history of exceptions to the categorical approach 
in the immigration context in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Taylor in 1990); Michael 
R. Devitt, Improper Deportation of Legal Permanent Residents: The U.S. Government’s Mischarac-
terization of the Supreme Court’s Decision in Nijhawan v. Holder, 15 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 1, 5 
(2013) (highlighting the high numbers of foreign nationals deported for fraud convictions following 
the Supreme Court’s creation of the circumstance-specific approach in Nijhawan). 
 30 See Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 38; Garza-Olivares, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 738–39; Dominguez-
Rodriguez, 261 I. & N. Dec. at 411; see also infra note 32 (summarizing cases establishing the cir-
cumstance-specific approach). 
 31 See Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 36 (noting the practical difficulties resulting from the Taylor Court’s 
restrictions on the evidence that may be consulted in categorical inquiries); Bianco v. Holder, 624 
F.3d 265, 272–73 (5th Cir. 2010) (setting no heightened limits on evidence that may be considered in 
circumstance-specific inquiries); In re H. Estrada, 26 I. & N. Dec. 749, 753 (B.I.A. 2016) (permitting 
the consultation of all “reliable” evidence in circumstance-specific inquiries); see also infra notes 86–
95 and accompanying text (critiquing the Fourth Circuit’s failure to establish evidentiary limits). 
 32 See Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 38 (finding that a fraud conviction triggered immigration conse-
quences based on the underlying facts, even though the statute of conviction did not contain as an 
element 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) (2012)’s requirement that a fraud offense result in “loss to the 
victim or victims exceed[ing] $10,000”); In re Garza-Olivares, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 738–39 (finding 
that a failure to appear conviction triggered immigration consequences based on the underlying facts, 
even though the statute of conviction did not contain as an element 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(T)’s re-
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The circumstance-specific approach was first articulated in the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s decision in 2009 in Nijhawan v. Holder.33 In Nijhawan, the 
Court held that the categorical approach should not be applied to determina-
tions of whether a fraud crime resulted in a loss of at least ten thousand dollars, 
and thus fell within the INA’s list of “aggravated felony” fraud offenses.34 Ra-
ther, adjudicators were to look to the record of conviction and any other relia-
ble evidence to determine the amount of loss caused by a respondent’s fraud 
crime.35 
In 2009 in United States v. Hayes, the Supreme Court similarly declined 
to use the categorical approach in a firearms possession case to determine 
whether a defendant had been convicted of a misdemeanor “crime of domestic 
violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), also known as the Lautenberg Amend-
ment.36 The Lautenberg Amendment, enacted in 1996, expanded § 922(g)’s 
prohibition on firearms possession by individuals convicted of certain felony 
offenses to also include misdemeanor domestic violence convictions.37 The 
                                                                                                                           
quirement that the respondent failed to appear “pursuant to a court order to answer to or dispose of a 
charge of a felony for which a sentence of 2 years’ imprisonment or more may be imposed”); In re 
Dominguez-Rodriguez, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 411 (finding that the exception to the controlled substance 
offense provision in 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), which applies when a conviction was based on “pos-
session for one’s own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana,” requires an inquiry of the facts underly-
ing the conviction rather than the elements of the statute of conviction). 
 33 See Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 38 (“The language of the provision is consistent with a circum-
stance-specific approach.”); Hernandez-Zavala, 806 F.3d at 264 (attributing the circumstance-specific 
approach to the Supreme Court’s decision in Nijhawan). 
 34 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) (defining aggravated felony fraud crimes as those “in which 
the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000”); Nijhawan, 557 U.S at 36. “Aggravated felony” 
convictions, including 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), result in mandatory detention, mandatory re-
moval without the possibility of discretionary relief, and bars on the ability to reenter the United 
States. See Erica Steinmiller-Perdomo, Note, Consequences Too Harsh for Noncitizens Convicted of 
Aggravated Felonies?, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1173, 1187–88 (2014). Based on the Court’s decision in 
Nijhawan, if a respondent has been convicted of a fraud crime, adjudicators may now conduct a factu-
al inquiry not limited to the record of conviction to determine whether the amount of loss exceeds 
$10,000. Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 36. Therefore, a fraud conviction may qualify as an aggravated felony 
and result in immigration consequences even if the statute of conviction does not have a monetary 
threshold as an element. Id. 
 35 See Nijhawan, 557 U.S at 36 (holding that the “fraud and deceit” provision of the INA “calls 
for a ‘circumstance-specific’ . . . interpretation”). 
 36 See United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415, 418 (2009) (resolving a split between the Fourth 
Circuit and nine other circuit courts and overturning the Fourth Circuit’s decision that under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(g)(9), the domestic relationship must be an element of the statute of conviction). 
 37 See Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104–208, 110 Stat. 3001 
(1996) (enacting the Lautenberg Amendment); 142 CONG. REC. S11,878 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) 
(statement of Sen. Lautenberg) (stating that the purpose of the Lautenberg Amendment is to ensure 
that “[i]f you beat your wife, if you beat your child, if you abuse your family and you are convicted, 
even of a misdemeanor, you have no right to possess a gun”); Tanjima Islam, Note, The Fourth Cir-
cuit’s Rejection of Legislative History: Placing Guns in the Hands of Domestic Violence Perpetrators, 
18 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 341, 344 (2010) (discussing the purpose of the Lautenberg 
Amendment). 
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Hayes Court emphasized that the existence of a domestic relationship, though 
required under the Lautenberg Amendment, is not an element of the predicate 
domestic violence offense, and therefore is not subject to the categorical ap-
proach.38 The Hayes Court justified its holding by explaining that Congress 
intended the Lautenberg Amendment to apply broadly to dangerous domestic 
violence crimes not charged as felonies and therefore not previously covered 
by other provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).39 As a result of Hayes, the Lauten-
berg Amendment’s restrictions can be triggered when a person commits a 
crime of violence and the facts underlying the conviction reveal that the victim 
and perpetrator were domestic partners, even if the underlying crime does not 
include a domestic relationship as an element.40 
C. Hernandez-Zavala v. Lynch: Facts and Procedural History 
On March 8th 2012, Hernan Hernandez-Zavala, a native and citizen of 
Mexico living in the United States without authorization, was charged with 
misdemeanor assault.41 The victim of the assault was Mr. Hernandez-Zavala’s 
partner, with whom he parented a child and shared an address.42 This criminal 
complaint brought Mr. Hernandez-Zavala to the attention of immigration au-
thorities, and the following day he was served with a notice to appear, charging 
that he was removable for having entered and continued living in the United 
States without authorization.43 Mr. Hernandez-Zavala conceded that he was 
                                                                                                                           
 38 Hayes, 555 U.S. at 426; see 142 CONG. REC. S11,878 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of 
Sen. Lautenberg) (noting that “convictions for domestic violence-related crimes are often for crimes, 
such as assault, that are not explicitly identified as related to domestic violence” and urging that “law 
enforcement authorities [should] thoroughly investigate misdemeanor convictions on an applicant’s 
criminal record to ensure that none involves domestic violence . . . ”). 
 39 Hayes, 555 U.S. at 426; see Bethany A. Corbin, Goodbye Earl: Domestic Abusers and Guns in 
the Wake of United States v. Castleman—Can the Supreme Court Save Domestic Violence Victims?, 
94 NEB. L. REV. 101, 120–21 (2015) (discussing Hayes); Islam, supra note 37, at 355–58 (arguing 
that the Hayes Court was correct to place significant weight on Senator Lautenberg’s floor statements 
regarding the Lautenberg Amendment). 
 40 Hayes, 555 U.S. at 426; Corbin, supra note 39, at 121 (explaining the significance of the Hayes 
Court’s holding). 
 41 Hernandez-Zavala, 806 F.3d at 261. The statute Mr. Hernandez-Zavala pled guilty to having 
violated provides that “assault, assault and battery, or affray” resulting in serious injury or involving a 
deadly weapon is a misdemeanor. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-33(c)(1) (2012); Hernandez-Zavala, 806 
F.3d at 261. 
 42 Hernandez-Zavala, 806 F.3d at 261. The actual existence of a relationship between Mr. Her-
nandez-Zavala and the victim of his assault conviction was undisputed, and Mr. Hernandez-Zavala 
described the victim in his brief as his “partner.” Id. 
 43 Id.; see also Ingrid V. Eagly, Criminal Justice for Noncitizens: An Analysis of Variation in 
Local Enforcement, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1126, 1147–51 (2013) (describing the ways in which the im-
migration and criminal justice systems interact to bring unauthorized immigrants to the attention of 
authorities in the early stages of a criminal case). The government charged Mr. Hernandez-Zavala 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (2012) for never having been admitted or paroled. Hernandez-
Zavala, 806 F.3d at 261. 
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removable on this ground and applied for discretionary relief from removal in 
the form of cancellation of removal for certain nonpermanent residents.44 On 
March 21st, Mr. Hernandez-Zavala pleaded guilty to assault with a deadly 
weapon.45 Then, on February 4th, the Department of Homeland Security 
moved to pretermit his application for cancellation of removal on the basis that 
he had been convicted of a “crime of domestic violence” and was therefore 
statutorily ineligible for relief.46 
The INA defines “crimes of domestic violence” as those that first meet 18 
U.S.C. § 16’s definition of “crimes of violence.”47 Courts have generally ac-
cepted that this provision requires a categorical analysis of whether a convic-
tion qualifies as a “crime of violence.”48 Secondly, the perpetrator and victim 
must share a domestic relationship.49 Mr. Hernandez-Zavala argued that be-
                                                                                                                           
 44 Hernandez-Zavala, 806 F.3d at 262; see 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b) (outlining the requirements of 
cancellation of removal for certain nonpermanent residents). Cancelation of removal for certain non-
permanent residents is a discretionary form of relief available to those who have been present in the 
United States for at least ten years, whose deportation would result in “exceptional and extremely 
unusual hardship” to a qualifying relative, who have been of “good moral character,” and who have 
not committed certain crimes. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). 
 45 Hernandez-Zavala, 806 F.3d at 261. 
 46 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b) (establishing as one of the requirements for cancellation of removal 
for certain nonpermanent residents that the applicant may not have been convicted of a crime listed 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)); see also id. § 1227(a)(2)(E) (including definitions for predicate crimes 
of domestic violence convictions); Hernandez-Zavala, 806 F.3d at 262 (listing the INA’s crime of 
domestic violence provision as the Department of Homeland Security’s reason for moving to preter-
mit Mr. Hernandez-Zavala’s application for relief). A crime of domestic violence is defined as:  
“Any alien who at any time after admission is convicted of a crime of domestic vio-
lence, a crime of stalking, or a crime of child abuse, child neglect, or child abandon-
ment is deportable. For purposes of this clause, the term ‘crime of domestic violence’ 
means any crime of violence (as defined in section 16 of Title 18) against a person 
committed by a current or former [partner] . . . .” 
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E).  
 47 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i); 18 U.S.C. § 16 (2012). Title 18 of the U.S. Code governs federal 
crimes and criminal procedure. Chapter 1 of Title 18 contains definitions of terms used throughout 
Title 18, including “crime of violence.” 18 U.S.C. § 16. A crime of violence is defined as: 
(a) an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physi-
cal force against the person or property of another, or (b) any other offense that is a fel-
ony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the 
person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense. 
Id. 
 48 See Hernandez-Zavala, 806 F.3d at 263 (concluding that assault with a deadly weapon was 
categorically a “crime of violence”); Bianco, 624 F.3d at 272 (concluding that aggravated assault was 
categorically a “crime of violence”); In re H. Estrada, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 750 (concluding that simple 
battery was categorically a “crime of violence”). 
 49 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i). The INA gives several examples of domestic relationships, includ-
ing spouses, co-parents, and cohabiting couples, and also says that any relationship “protected . . . 
under the domestic or family violence laws of the United States or any State, Indian tribal govern-
ment, or unit of local government” suffices. Id. 
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cause the statute under which he was convicted did not include as an element a 
domestic relationship between the victim and abuser, it therefore is not a cate-
gorical match to the offense of domestic violence described in the INA.50 
The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) rejected Mr. Hernandez-Zavala’s argument 
and granted the government’s motion, concluding first that Mr. Hernandez-
Zavala had been convicted of a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16 and 
second that the facts of Mr. Hernandez-Zavala’s conviction satisfied the neces-
sary domestic relationship requirement.51 Mr. Hernandez-Zavala appealed to 
the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA” or “the Board”), arguing that the IJ 
erred as a matter of law in admitting and examining evidence of the facts un-
derlying his criminal conviction.52 The BIA affirmed the decision of the IJ 
based on its adoption of the circumstance-specific approach, permitting exam-
ination of underlying evidence to establish the existence of a domestic rela-
tionship.53 Mr. Hernandez-Zavala subsequently appealed the BIA’s decision to 
the Fourth Circuit.54 
II. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT’S ADOPTION OF THE CIRCUMSTANCE-SPECIFIC 
APPROACH WITH RESPECT TO “CRIMES OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE” 
In 2015, in Hernandez-Zavala v. Lynch, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit held that the circumstance-specific approach should be used to 
determine whether convictions under state criminal statutes qualify as “crimes 
of domestic violence” as defined in the INA, and therefore result in immigra-
tion consequences.55 Section A of this part examines the Fourth Circuit’s reli-
ance in Hernandez-Zavala on the Supreme Court’s 2009 decisions in Nijhawan 
v. Holder and United States v. Hayes.56 Section B discusses the current state of 
                                                                                                                           
 50 See id. (defining crimes of domestic violence triggering immigration consequences); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 14-33(c)(1) (2012); Hernandez-Zavala, 806 F.3d at 263 (noting Mr. Hernandez-Zavala’s sole 
contention on appeal was that the IJ should have applied the categorical approach to determine wheth-
er he had convicted a “crime of domestic violence” as defined by the INA). 
 51 Hernandez-Zavala, 806 F.3d at 262. The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) engaged in both a modified 
categorical and a circumstance-specific analysis, and determined that under either approach, Mr. Her-
nandez-Zavala had been convicted of a crime of domestic violence triggering immigration conse-
quences. Id. 
 52 Id. The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA” or “the Board”) is the administrative body that 
hears appeals of decisions by IJs. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b) (2016) (establishing the Board’s appellate 
jurisdiction). BIA decisions are binding on IJs nationwide unless they are overruled by the Board, the 
attorney general, or a federal court. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g) (outlining when BIA decisions serve as 
precedent). See generally DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS PRACTICE MANUAL 
(2016) (establishing informal guidelines for BIA procedures). 
 53 Hernandez-Zavala, 806 F.3d at 262. 
 54 Id. 
 55 See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) (2012); Hernandez-Zavala v. Lynch, 806 F.3d 259, 266–67 
(4th Cir. 2015); supra notes 29–40 and accompanying text (describing the circumstance-specific ap-
proach). 
 56 See infra notes 58–65 and accompanying text. 
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the law with respect to immigrants charged with having been convicted of 
“crimes of domestic violence” in light of a preexisting circuit split, the Fourth 
Circuit’s decision in Hernandez-Zavala, and the BIA’s subsequent decision in 
2016 in In re H. Estrada.57 
A. The Fourth Circuit’s Reliance on the Supreme Court’s  
Decisions in Nijhawan and Hayes 
In assessing Mr. Hernandez-Zavala’s case, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the 
BIA’s use of the circumstance-specific approach to determine whether the do-
mestic relationship requirement was satisfied, and denied Mr. Hernandez-
Zavala’s petition for review.58 The Fourth Circuit gave three primary justifica-
tions for its adoption of the circumstance-specific approach with respect to 
“crimes of domestic violence” as defined in the INA.59 First, it reasoned that 
the language used in the INA reveals that Congress intended the relationship 
requirement to be a limitation on the crimes of violence that trigger immigra-
tion consequences, rather than an element of a more specific generic crime of 
domestic violence.60 Secondly, the Fourth Circuit looked to the Supreme 
Court’s 2009 decision in Hayes, and found the Hayes Court’s holding that 
“crimes of domestic violence” under the Lautenberg Amendment require a cir-
cumstance-specific analysis to determine the existence of a domestic relation-
ship instructive, despite the different context and slightly different wording in 
the INA and the Lautenberg Amendment.61 
                                                                                                                           
 57 See infra notes 66–74 and accompanying text. 
 58 Hernandez-Zavala, 806 F.3d at 266, 268. 
 59 Id. at 266–67; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) (defining “crimes of domestic violence”). 
 60 Hernandez-Zavala, 806 F.3d at 266. In particular, the Fourth Circuit referenced the phrase 
“committed by” in 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) as an indication that Congress intended that the cate-
gorical approach be used to determine if a conviction was for a “crime of violence” and the circum-
stance-specific approach be used to determine whether there was a domestic relationship. Id. In reach-
ing this conclusion, the Fourth Circuit relied on the Supreme Court’s 2013 opinion in Moncrieffe v. 
Holder, in which it reconciled its prior 2009 holding in Nijhawan v. Holder with its ongoing defense 
of the categorical approach by distinguishing between provisions in the INA that refer to generic 
crimes and those that contain exceptions calling for fact-finding into the attendant circumstances of a 
particular conviction. Id.; see Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1691 (2013); Nijhawan v. Hold-
er, 557 U.S. 29, 32 (2009). 
 61 Hernandez-Zavala, 806 F.3d at 266; see also 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A) (2012) (defining mis-
demeanor “crimes of domestic violence” as listed under § 922(g)(9)); United States v. Hayes, 555 
U.S. 415, 418 (2009) (holding that for purposes of the Lautenberg Amendment, a domestic relation-
ship “need not be a defining element of the predicate offense”). The Fourth Circuit was unconvinced 
by Mr. Hernandez-Zavala’s argument that 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A) and 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) 
require different analytic approaches on account of the existence of the singular term “element” in 18 
USC § 921(a)(33)(A) and the absence of such a term in 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i). Hernandez-
Zavala, 806 F.3d at 266. The Fourth Circuit stated that because 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) references 
18 USC § 16, which does contain the singular term “element,” Mr. Hernandez-Zavala’s argument was 
without merit. Id. 
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Finally, the Fourth Circuit based its holding in Hernandez-Zavala on prac-
tical considerations.62 Citing both Nijhawan and Hayes, the Fourth Circuit con-
cluded that Congress could not have intended that the categorical approach apply 
to the domestic relationship requirement in 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) because 
at the time this statutory provision was enacted, only approximately one third of 
all states had statutes in place that included a domestic relationship element.63 
Moreover, even in those states that did have separate domestic violence statutes, 
domestic violence crimes were often prosecuted under general assault and bat-
tery statutes.64 Requiring the categorical approach to determine the existence of 
a domestic relationship would therefore have made § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) meaning-
less in most states.65 
B. The Current State of the Law Concerning Immigration Consequences of 
“Crimes of Domestic Violence” 
The Fourth Circuit made its decision in the context of an existing circuit 
split on the issue of whether to use the categorical or circumstance-specific 
approach to determine whether a past conviction was for a “crime of violence” 
perpetrated against an individual with whom the perpetrator was in a domestic 
relationship within the meaning of the INA.66 In 2010, in Bianco v. Holder, the 
                                                                                                                           
 62 Hernandez-Zavala, 806 F.3d at 266–67. 
 63 Id. The Lautenberg Amendment was passed in the same year as the INA was amended to in-
clude the provision codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), and the Hayes Court cited the same statis-
tic and practicality concerns as a basis for its holding. Hayes, 555 U.S. at 426–27; Hernandez-Zavala, 
806 F.3d at 266–67. The Supreme Court acknowledged a similar argument in Nijhawan, noting that at 
the time the case was decided only three applicable criminal fraud statutes contained any monetary 
threshold element as required by the INA. Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 39. 
 64 Hayes, 555 U.S. at 427; Hernandez-Zavala, 806 F.3d at 266–67; see 142 CONG. REC. S11,878 
(daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg) (discussing the common prosecution of 
domestic violence offenses under statutes “not explicitly identified as related to domestic violence” as 
a reason why the Lautenberg Amendment should be thoroughly enforced and broadly applied). 
 65 See Hernandez-Zavala, 806 F.3d at 267 (referencing the Hayes Court’s concern that if the 
categorical approach were applied to the domestic relationship requirement of the Lautenberg 
Amendment, the provision would have been “dead letter” in a majority of states). As part of its expla-
nation of how practicality concerns indicate the need for a circumstance-specific approach, the Fourth 
Circuit distinguished between the Supreme Court’s decision in Nijhawan and the Fourth Circuit’s 
2012 decision in Prudencio v. Holder. See id. (citing Prudencio v. Holder, 669 F.3d 472, 484 (4th Cir. 
2012)). In Prudencio, the Fourth Circuit rejected the circumstance-specific approach as a way to de-
termine if a crime involves moral turpitude. Prudencio, 669 F.3d at 484. The difference between the 
statutory provisions at issue in these two cases, the Fourth Circuit reasoned, is whether the factual 
inquiry requires minimal interpretation or whether it requires more extensive evaluation of underlying 
facts by an IJ. See Hernandez-Zavala, 806 F.3d at 267 (referencing the Prudencio court’s distinction 
between circumstance-specific inquiries involving purely “objective” matters, and those involving 
extensive evaluation of underlying evidence of a criminal conviction); Prudencio, 669 F.3d at 484 
(holding that “an adjudicator applying the moral turpitude statute may consider only the alien’s prior 
conviction and not the conduct underlying that conviction”). 
 66 See Hernandez-Zavala, 806 F.3d at 267; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E) (defining crimes of 
domestic violence triggering immigration consequences). Compare Bianco v. Holder, 624 F.3d 265, 
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U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit adopted the circumstance-specific 
approach to determine the existence of a domestic relationship.67 The U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the only other circuit to have addressed 
this issue as of this writing, continues to rely on its 2004 decision in Tokatly v. 
Ashcroft that nothing outside the record of conviction may be consulted to 
reach such a determination.68 Looking at both Bianco and Tokatly, the Fourth 
Circuit found the Ninth Circuit’s decision unpersuasive considering the Su-
preme Court’s intervening rulings in Nijhawan and Hayes.69 
                                                                                                                           
272–73 (5th Cir. 2010) (applying the circumstance-specific approach to the domestic relationship 
requirement of the INA’s definition of crimes of domestic violence), with Tokatly v. Ashcroft, 371 
F.3d 613, 624–25 (9th Cir. 2004) (applying the modified categorical approach to the domestic rela-
tionship requirement of the INA’s definition of crimes of domestic violence). See generally KATHY 
BRADY, DEPORTABLE CRIMES OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: MATTER OF H. ESTRADA (2016) (contrasting the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s adoption of the modified categorical approach with respect 
to crimes of domestic violence under the INA with other circuits’ adoption of the circumstance-specific 
approach); Mark Fleming, Bianco v. Holder (5th Cir., October 19, 2010), NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUST. 
CTR., https://www.immigrantjustice.org/litigation/blog/bianco-v-holder [https://perma.cc/YVM7-
BUSU] (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (noting the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s departure 
from the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Tokatly and from the categorical and modified categorical ap-
proaches in its adoption of the circumstance-specific approach with respect to crimes of domestic 
violence in Bianco). 
 67 Bianco, 624 F.3d at 272–73. The respondent in Bianco was convicted of aggravated assault for 
stabbing a victim who the criminal complaint and affidavit of probable cause revealed was her hus-
band. Id. at 267. The respondent argued that the IJ erred in admitting evidence outside the record of 
conviction to determine the existence of a domestic relationship rather than applying the categorical or 
modified categorical approach. Id. at 268. In departing from the Ninth Circuit’s approach to the do-
mestic relationship determination, the Fifth Circuit cited the practicality concerns discussed by the 
Supreme Court in Nijhawan and Hayes. Id. at 272. The Fifth Circuit also borrowed from the Hayes 
Court’s reasoning regarding statutory interpretation to determine that the domestic relationship re-
quirement of 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) need not be an element of the underlying crime. Id.  
 68 See Olivas-Motta v. Holder, 746 F.3d 907, 912–13 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that the categorical 
and modified categorical approaches must be applied to determinations of whether a conviction was 
for a crime involving moral turpitude, and citing Tokatly as precedent); Tokatly, 371 F.3d at 624–25 
(applying the modified categorical approach to the domestic relationship determination of 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(E)(i)). The respondent in Tokatly was convicted of burglary and attempted kidnapping 
and charged as removable for having been convicted of a crime of domestic violence. Tokatly, 371 
F.3d at 615. At the removal hearing, because the record of conviction did not establish the existence of 
a domestic relationship, the government called the victim of the crime as a witness to testify as to her 
prior relationship with the respondent. Id. at 616. The Ninth Circuit held that consultation of testimo-
nial evidence to determine the existence of a domestic relationship was improper, and stated that strict 
adherence to the Taylor Court’s bar against “looking beyond the record of conviction in order to con-
sider the particular facts underlying an alien’s prior offense” was necessary to avoid “resorting to the 
type of mini-trials [it] deem[ed] to be wholly inappropriate in this context.” Id. at 621. Given that 
Tokatly was decided prior to Nijhawan and Hayes, the Ninth Circuit noted that it had never before 
“divided the [underlying] crime into segments . . . and required that one part be proven by the record 
of conviction and the other by evidence adduced at the administrative hearing.” Id. at 622. 
 69 Hernandez-Zavala, 806 F.3d at 267. Immigration legal advocates also acknowledge that the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Tokatly does not conform with current understandings of the categorical, 
modified categorical, or circumstance-specific approaches, and is therefore likely to face challenges in 
the future. See, e.g., BRADY, supra note 66, at 3 (“[T]he Ninth Circuit may well decide to change the 
Tokatly rule when it next addresses the issue.”). But see Olivas-Motta, 746 F.3d at 912–13 (citing 
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The BIA’s 2016 decision in In re H. Estrada has further strengthened the 
significance of the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in Hernandez-Zavala.70 In Estra-
da, the BIA approved the removability of a lawful permanent resident based on 
a 1999 conviction for simple battery in the state of Georgia.71 The respondent 
unsuccessfully argued that the IJ erred by consulting evidence outside the rec-
ord of conviction to determine that he shared a domestic relationship with the 
victim of the battery, specifically given that a separate family violence statute 
existed in Georgia.72 
In Estrada, the BIA discussed Hernandez-Zavala, and like the Fourth Cir-
cuit, focused on the impracticality of applying the categorical approach to certain 
provisions of the INA, concluding that Congress could not have intended for 
adjudicators to be so restricted.73 Furthermore, the BIA instructed that “all relia-
ble evidence,” including police reports and other components of pretrial investi-
gation reports, may be considered in circumstance-specific inquiries.74 
                                                                                                                           
Tokatly as precedent for the argument that courts cannot “look to conduct that an alien ‘committed’ to 
determine the acts he has been ‘convicted of,’” despite the Supreme Court’s intervening decisions in 
Nijhawan and Hayes). 
 70 See In re Estrada, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 751–53 (summarizing and agreeing with the Fourth Cir-
cuit’s decision in Hernandez-Zavala). Because decisions of the BIA are binding on parties nation-
wide, the BIA’s decision in Estrada essentially extended the holdings of the Fourth Circuit in Her-
nandez-Zavala and the Fifth Circuit in Bianco to everywhere except the Ninth Circuit, where Tokatly 
still controls. See id. 751 (citing Tokatly as contrary precedent to Hernandez-Zavala); 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.1(g) (2016). 
 71 In re Estrada, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 749, 756. 
 72 Id. at 750, 752. In Estrada, the Board upheld the IJ’s finding that the domestic relationship 
requirement was satisfied based on the admission as evidence of two incident reports not contained in 
the record of conviction. Id. at 754. One of these reports listed the same address for the respondent 
and the victim of the assault crime, and included a statement from the victim that the respondent was 
her boyfriend. Id. The second piece of evidence was a “Family Violence Incident Report,” which the 
state only required following incidents involving domestic violence. Id. at 754–55. 
 73 Id. at 753; see Hernandez-Zavala, 806 F.3d at 266–67. The BIA further concluded that the 
circumstance-specific approach with respect to “crimes of domestic violence” does not present any 
due process concerns, given that respondents charged under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) have two 
opportunities to contest allegations against them—once in criminal and once in immigration proceed-
ings. See Estrada, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 752. 
 74 Estrada, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 753. As the law currently stands everywhere outside the Ninth 
Circuit, therefore, in determining whether an immigrant was convicted of a “crime of domestic vio-
lence,” adjudicators may examine the facts underlying the conviction and consider all “reliable” evi-
dence to reach a decision as to whether the respondent committed a “crime of violence” against some-
one with whom he or she was in a domestic relationship. See Hernandez-Zavala, 806 F.3d at 261, 266 
(adopting the circumstance-specific approach and examining “substantial evidence in the record”); 
Tokatly, 371 F.3d at 624–25 (applying the modified categorical approach and sustaining the nonciti-
zen’s objection to examination of testimonial evidence); Estrada, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 753 (applying the 
circumstance-specific approach and examining police incident reports); see also infra notes 86–95 and 
accompanying text (discussing the problematic lack of evidentiary restrictions for circumstance-
specific inquiries in immigration cases). 
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III. ERRORS IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION IN HERNANDEZ-ZAVALA 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit’s 2015 decision in Her-
nandez-Zavala v. Lynch and the general departure from strict use of the cate-
gorical approach are problematic for two main reasons.75 First, as discussed in 
Section A of this Part, in adopting the circumstance-specific approach with 
respect to certain provisions of the INA, courts have failed to fully reconcile 
their decisions with the historic application of the categorical approach in im-
migration cases and the immigration-specific justifications for retaining this 
analytic tool.76 Secondly, as discussed in Section B, the failure of adjudicators 
to set any limits on evidence that may be considered in circumstance-specific 
inquiries severely and unjustly disadvantages immigrant respondents.77 
A. The Need for Greater Recognition of the History of and Unique 
Justifications for the Categorical Approach in an Immigration Context 
Decisions adopting the circumstance-specific approach with respect to 
immigration consequences of criminal convictions have emphasized the differ-
ences between the INA and ACCA as justification for declining to extend the 
categorical approach to certain provisions of the INA.78 These decisions fail to 
                                                                                                                           
 75 See infra notes 78–95 and accompanying text (discussing the problems with the Fourth Cir-
cuit’s decision in Hernandez-Zavala); supra notes 15–28 and accompanying text (explaining the cate-
gorical approach); supra notes 29–40 and accompanying text (explaining the circumstance-specific 
approach). See generally Hernandez-Zavala v. Lynch, 806 F.3d 259 (4th Cir. 2015). 
 76 See infra notes 78–85 and accompanying text. 
 77 See infra notes 86–95 and accompanying text. 
 78 See Bianco v. Holder, 624 F.3d 265, 270 (5th Cir. 2010) (referencing the arguments made in 
the Court’s 2009 decision in Nijhawan v. Holder as to distinctions between the ACCA and INA). 
Compare Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2287 (2013) (applying the categorical approach 
to determining whether a sentencing enhancement under the ACCA was triggered, and citing “the 
Sixth Amendment concerns that would arise from sentencing courts’ making findings of fact that 
properly belong to juries”), with Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 36 (2009) (adopting the circum-
stance-specific approach for determining whether the monetary threshold requirement of the “fraud 
and deceit” aggravated felony provision of the INA has been met, and noting that “[t]he ‘aggravated 
felony’ statute . . . differs in general from ACCA”). Courts have pointed out first that compared to the 
ACCA, the INA lists several crimes that do not correspond with any generic crime and require more 
interpretation and fact-finding than the categorical approach permits. See Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 37 
(“[T]he ‘aggravated felony’ statute differs from ACCA in that it lists certain other ‘offenses’ using 
language that almost certainly does not refer to generic crimes but refers to specific circumstances.”); 
In re Babaisakov, 24 I. & N. Dec. 306, 310 (B.I.A. 2007) (stating that adoption of the categorical 
approach depends on whether the statutory provision is made up of a combination of elements or 
contains “nonelement factors” permitting a circumstance-specific inquiry). Secondly, courts have 
emphasized that while in the criminal sentencing context Sixth Amendment concerns justify adher-
ence to the categorical approach, such protections do not exist in civil immigration cases. See Nijha-
wan, 557 U.S. at 36–40 (implying that Sixth Amendment issues with circumstance-specific inquiries 
could only arise in cases in which a defendant is charged with illegal reentry after having previously 
been convicted of an aggravated felony); Ali v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 737, 741 (7th Cir. 2008) (allowing 
circumstance-specific inquiries to determine whether a crime involved moral turpitude because the 
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acknowledge, however, the many ways in which immigrant respondents in civ-
il removal proceedings are procedurally disadvantaged compared to defendants 
in criminal sentencing cases.79 For example, indigent respondents do not have 
a right to affordable legal representation, and those who are charged with hav-
ing committed certain crimes may be subject to expedited removal, ineligible 
for discretionary relief, and detained without a right to a bond hearing.80 Addi-
tionally, evidence that would be barred under the Federal Rules of Evidence is 
admissible in immigration court.81 The differences between civil immigration 
and criminal sentencing cases should therefore have resulted in a stricter, ra-
                                                                                                                           
Sixth Amendment does not apply); Das, supra note 15, at 1677 (discussing how courts have come to 
distinguish the application of the categorical approach in criminal sentencing and immigration con-
texts). 
 79 See Jennifer M. Chacón, A Diversion of Attention? Immigration Courts and the Adjudication of 
Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 DUKE L.J. 1563, 1624 (2010) (discussing the frequent use of 
tactics in immigration cases which would be considered Fourth or Fifth Amendment violations in 
criminal settings, and arguing for the extension of the Exclusionary Rule in immigration proceedings); 
Das, supra note 15, at 1671 (discussing the ways in which deportation, though technically a civil pen-
alty, is “particularly severe”); Mary Holper, Confronting Cops in Immigration Court, 23 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 675, 675 (2015) (describing how police reports, though often barred in criminal 
settings due to Sixth Amendment rights and restrictions in the Federal Rules of Evidence, are admis-
sible and can make the difference between a denial or a grant in immigration court); Chris Modlish, 
Comment, Immigrant Rights in Jeopardy: A Denial of Constitutional Protection in De La Paz v. Coy, 
57 B.C. L. REV. E. SUPP. 104, 115–17 (2016), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=3501&context=bclr [https://perma.cc/6NBB-5UAP] (discussing the insufficient remedial 
mechanisms provided under the INA and the lack of Fourth Amendment protections for unlawfully 
arrested noncitizens); Steinmiller-Perdomo, supra note 34, at 1187 (critiquing the retroactivity of 
aggravated felony provisions of the INA, and discussing the many consequences for a noncitizen of an 
aggravated felony conviction, including mandatory detention; bars against re-entry and naturalization; 
and enhanced sentencing for illegal re-entry); supra note 32 (discussing cases that have adopted the 
circumstance-specific approach). 
 80 See Das, supra note 15, at 1672 (explaining that criminal convictions act as immigration “man-
datory minimums” by eliminating the possibility of certain forms of discretionary relief); Steinmiller-
Perdomo, supra note 34, at 1187–88 (listing the consequences of aggravated felony convictions). See 
generally INGRID EAGLY & STEVEN SHAFER, ACCESS TO COUNSEL IN IMMIGRATION COURT (2016) 
(addressing the disparate outcomes for immigrants who are and are not able to access and afford coun-
sel). 
 81 See Holper, supra note 79, at 693 (discussing concerns related to admissibility of unreliable 
evidence in immigration court due to deportation being a civil rather than criminal penalty). Although 
not all constitutional rights extend to immigration proceedings, the Sixth Amendment’s procedural 
protections and the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause have been found to apply to noncitizens 
facing removal. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (recognizing the right of a lawful 
permanent resident returning from abroad to invoke the Due Process Clause regarding proceedings 
concerning whether she would be allowed to return to the United States); Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 
U.S. 86 (1903) (recognizing the right of a noncitizen facing deportation to constitutional due process 
protections). The lack of evidentiary restrictions regarding immigration inquiries not governed by the 
categorical or modified categorical approach implicates these due process concerns. See Holper, supra 
note 79, at 713 (arguing that even if deportation is a civil offense, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment guarantees the right to confront and cross-examine authors of and witnesses quoted in 
police reports admitted as evidence). 
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ther than a more relaxed, adherence to the categorical approach in the immi-
gration context.82 
In contrast to earlier decisions adopting the circumstance-specific ap-
proach, in Hernandez-Zavala the Fourth Circuit based its decision largely on 
similarities between the INA and the Lautenberg Amendment, the statute at 
issue in the Supreme Court’s 2009 decision in United States v. Hayes.83 The 
Hayes Court’s focus on Congress’s intent that the Lautenberg Amendment ap-
ply broadly suggests, however, that the Court’s interpretation of the provision 
does not transfer seamlessly to an immigration context.84 The different purpos-
es of the Lautenberg Amendment and the INA criminal removal and inadmis-
sibility grounds, as well as the different procedural protections provided to 
criminal defendants and immigrant respondents, should have cautioned the 
Fourth Circuit against applying the Hayes Court’s reasoning to Mr. Hernandez-
Zavala’s case.85 
                                                                                                                           
 82 See United States ex rel. Guarino v. Uhl, 107 F.2d 399, 400 (2d Cir. 1939) (embracing a strict 
categorical approach, based in part on the severity of deportations); Das, supra note 15, at 1701–02 
(discussing the early history of the categorical approach in the immigration context, and noting that 
although federal immigration laws have dramatically evolved over the years, the language informing 
the development of the categorical approach has remained constant); Koh, supra note 17, at 262 (ar-
guing that the categorical approach “corrects for the absence of procedural and substantive rights for 
the noncitizen”). Recent decisions by the Supreme Court have begun to acknowledge the historical 
context and unique importance of the categorical approach in immigration proceedings. See Mellouli 
v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1986–87 (2015) (noting the long history of the categorical approach in 
immigration law, and stating that “[by] focusing on the legal question of what a conviction necessarily 
established, the categorical approach ordinarily works to promote efficiency, fairness, and predictabil-
ity in the administration of immigration law”); Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1685 (2013) 
(noting the categorical approach’s “long pedigree in our Nation’s immigration law”). 
 83 See United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415, 426 (2009). Compare Hernandez-Zavala, 806 F.3d 
at 266 (basing the adoption of the circumstance-specific approach on similarities between the INA and 
the Lautenberg Amendment), with Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 36 (basing adoption of the circumstance-
specific approach on differences between the INA and the ACCA). 
 84 See Hayes, 555 U.S. at 426. The Hayes Court’s reasoning has been adopted in the immigration 
context. See Hernandez-Zavala, 806 F.3d at 266 (adopting the circumstance-specific approach with 
regard to crimes of domestic violence under the INA, and relying on the Hayes Court’s adoption of 
the circumstance-specific approach with regard to crimes of domestic violence under the Lautenberg 
Amendment); Bianco, 624 F.3d at 271 (same); In re Estrada, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 751–52 (same). In 
United States v. Castleman, however, in 2014, the Supreme Court expressly stated that its adoption of 
a broad definition of “violence” for predicate offenses under the Lautenberg Amendment should not 
be seen as transforming the more narrow definition used in 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) (2012) immi-
gration cases. United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405, 1411 n.4 (2014). 
 85 See DAN KESSELBRENNER ET AL., WHY UNITED STATES V. CASTLEMAN DOES NOT HURT YOUR 
IMMIGRATION CASE AND MAY HELP IT 6 (2014) (advising practitioners on how to use Castleman to 
argue that the Hayes decision regarding the circumstance-specific approach should not apply to immi-
gration cases); Das, supra note 15, at 1701–02 (arguing for the categorical approach’s continued ap-
plication based on “congressional intent and the longstanding rationales for categorical analysis”). 
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B. The Need for Evidentiary Restrictions in Circumstance-Specific Inquiries 
The Fourth Circuit’s embrace of the circumstance-specific approach is al-
so problematic considering the lack of evidentiary limitations currently im-
posed on immigration adjudicators conducting circumstance-specific inquir-
ies.86 Since the Supreme Court’s 2009 decision in Nijhawan v. Holder, circum-
stance-specific inquiries have involved the consultation of evidence outside the 
record of conviction, including presentence investigative reports.87 While such 
evidence on its face may leave little question as to whether the domestic rela-
tionship requirement of 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) was satisfied, police re-
ports are often inaccurate, and the pivotal role they play in immigration cases 
is therefore concerning.88 
                                                                                                                           
 86 See Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 41 (holding that “nothing in prior law” limits IJs in the evidence that 
they may consider when determining whether a respondent has violated a provision of the INA that 
does not require the categorical or modified categorical approach); Bianco, 624 F.3d at 272–73 (hold-
ing that a domestic relationship requirement must be proven by the government “using the kind of 
evidence generally admissible before an immigration judge”); In re Estrada, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 753 
(stating that police reports and records may be considered in circumstance-specific inquiries); Devitt, 
supra note 29, at 39 (highlighting the unreliability of presentence investigation reports often consid-
ered in circumstance-specific inquiries); Koh, supra note 17, at 263 (arguing that the categorical ap-
proach is a necessary tool in light of “the absence of (a) proportionality and discretionary relief under 
the current statutory frame-work; (b) restrictions on Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)’s 
prosecutorial powers; and (c) judicial review”). 
 87 See Bianco, 624 F.3d at 273 (relying on a police criminal complaint and affidavit of probable 
cause showing that the victim was the respondent’s husband); In re Estrada, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 753–
54 (relying on a police report and presentence “Family Violence Incident Report” listing the same 
address for the respondent and the victim and including a statement from the victim referring to the 
respondent as her “boyfriend”); Devitt, supra note 29, at 39; see also Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 41–42 
(relying on “[t]he defendant’s own stipulation, produced for sentencing purposes” showing that the 
monetary threshold requirement of the deceit or fraud aggravated felony provision was satisfied). 
 88 See Devitt, supra note 29, at 9 (explaining that presentence investigation reports are “notori-
ously untrustworthy”); Holper, supra note 79, at 682–88 (explaining that police reports are unreliable 
given that officers and individuals interviewed are not required to testify in immigration court; the fact 
that reports are written in the initial stages of an investigation and do not reflect later discoveries; and 
the possibility that witnesses may have given untrue or exaggerated statements to police or that police 
officers may falsify information). In its 2012 decision in Prudencio v. Holder, the Fourth Circuit rea-
soned that the use of police reports to determine whether a conviction was for a crime involving moral 
turpitude “pose[d] very real evidentiary concerns” given that police reports and other elements of a 
presentence investigation report contain “unsworn witness statements and initial impressions.” 669 
F.3d 472, 483–84 (4th Cir. 2012). The Prudencio court acknowledged that immigration proceedings 
are civil rather than criminal, but held that “this difference does not affect the risks inherent in consid-
ering facts only alleged, but not necessarily proved, in the underlying criminal proceedings.” Id. at 
484. Though the Fourth Circuit in Hernandez-Zavala distinguished its decision in Prudencio on the 
basis of the type of inquiry involved in establishing moral turpitude versus the existence of a domestic 
relationship, it failed to reconcile its earlier critique of the use of police reports to establish the facts 
underlying a criminal conviction with its subsequent failure to limit the evidence that may be consid-
ered in a circumstance-specific inquiry concerning a potential “crime of domestic violence.” See Her-
nandez-Zavala, 806 F.3d at 267. 
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The lack of evidentiary restrictions in circumstance-specific inquiries re-
lates to the development of increasingly strict guidelines for the use of the 
“modified categorical approach.”89 Historically, courts have used the phrase 
“modified categorical approach” to refer to the consultation of limited docu-
ments within the record of conviction to determine under which provision of a 
divisible statute an individual was convicted, as well as to impose more gen-
eral limits on the evidence that may be considered in determining immigration 
consequences of criminal convictions.90 The Supreme Court’s 2016 decision in 
Mathis v. United States, however, strictly limits the modified categorical ap-
proach to analyses of convictions under statutes that contain alternative ele-
ments.91 Unless the circumstance-specific approach applies, therefore, if a 
statute is found to be indivisible, nothing beyond the elements of the statute 
may be consulted to determine whether the conviction triggers immigration 
consequences.92 
Restrictions on the situations in which the modified categorical approach 
may be applied have strengthened the protective force of this analytical ap-
proach, given that the record of conviction may only be consulted after deter-
                                                                                                                           
 89 See Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2248–49, 2257 (2016) (holding that the modified 
categorical approach may only be used if a statute of conviction contains “multiple alternative ele-
ments” and not simply “alternative means of satisfying” a requirement); Evan Tsen Lee, Mathis v. 
U.S. and the Future of the Categorical Approach, 101 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 263, 263 (2016), 
http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Lee-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/C9SE-
CSNG] (discussing the significance of the dissenting opinions of Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Alito 
in Mathis, and arguing that even though Mathis affirmed and adopted a strict interpretation of the 
categorical approach, these dissents indicate a questionable future for the categorical approach over-
all). 
 90 See Tokatly v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 613, 620 (9th Cir. 2004) (using the phrase “modified cate-
gorical approach” to refer to evidentiary limits when determining the existence of a domestic relation-
ship); United States ex rel. Zaffarano v. Corsi, 63 F.2d 757, 757–58 (2d Cir. 1933) (allowing consulta-
tion of only the record of conviction to determine if a conviction was for a crime involving moral 
turpitude, without engaging in a divisibility analysis). Consultation of the record of conviction to 
determine whether a conviction under a non-divisible statute constituted an offense listed in the INA 
has been referred to as the “minority” version of the modified categorical approach. Rebecca Sharp-
less, Toward a True Elements Test: Taylor and the Categorical Analysis of Crimes in Immigration 
Law, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 979, 999–1000 (2008). 
 91 See Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2257. See generally MANNY VARGAS ET AL., PRACTICE ALERT: IN 
MATHIS V. UNITED STATES, SUPREME COURT REAFFIRMS AND BOLSTERS STRICT APPLICATION OF 
THE CATEGORICAL APPROACH (2016) (discussing the implications for practitioners after Mathis). 
 92 See Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2256 (holding that a court may review materials from the record of 
conviction only when a statute is divisible and for the purpose of determining under which version of 
the statute the defendant was convicted); see also id. at 2269 (Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing against 
the majority’s holding, which absolves the defendant of the criminal sentencing enhancement trig-
gered by a generic “burglary” conviction, when the charging documents for his five convictions under 
an overbroad, indivisible burglary statute make clear that the facts underlying the convictions align 
with the generic offense); VARGAS ET AL., supra note 91, at 3 (explaining the Mathis Court’s holding 
that if a statute contains “different factual means of committing a single element” but is nonetheless 
indivisible, “the adjudicator may not look beyond the statute to the record of conviction”).  
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mining that the statute of conviction is truly divisible.93 Recent developments 
in when the modified categorical approach may be applied, however, suggest 
that new guidelines are needed to restrict the evidence that may be introduced 
when conducting circumstance-specific inquiries.94 Given the procedural diffi-
culties faced by respondents, the lack of any evidentiary restrictions on cir-
cumstance-specific inquiries leaves them with limited ability to contest the 
government’s evidence and little hope of winning the removal cases brought 
against them.95 
CONCLUSION 
In 2015, in Hernandez-Zavala v. Lynch, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit designated the domestic relationship requirement of the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act’s “crimes of domestic violence” provision as re-
quiring the circumstance-specific, rather than the categorical, approach. In al-
                                                                                                                           
 93 See Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2257 (holding that because the statute of conviction was overbroad 
and indivisible, it did not trigger a sentencing enhancement); Lee, supra note 89, at 263 (noting that 
for immigration advocates, the Mathis decision was “cause for celebration” because generally “the 
categorical approach is favorable to . . . immigration petitioners because it prevents the government 
from getting incriminating facts into evidence”). 
 94 See Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2257 (distinguishing between alternative means and elements for the 
purpose of determining if a statute is divisible and therefore whether the modified categorical ap-
proach may be applied); Devitt, supra note 29, at 39 (arguing against the use of presentence investiga-
tion reports as evidence in removal proceedings); Holper, supra note 79, at 682–88 (arguing that po-
lice reports are unreliable evidence that should not be admissible in removal proceedings). 
 95 See Devitt, supra note 29, at 46; Holper, supra note 79, at 682–88. The difference between the 
categorical or modified categorical and the circumstance-specific approaches also may determine 
whether a respondent bears the burden of proving that a prior conviction does not bar eligibility for 
relief. See Syblis v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 763 F.3d 348, 357 n.12 (3d Cir. 2014); Thomas v. 
Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 625 F.3d 134, 147 (3d Cir. 2010); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d) (2016). For exam-
ple, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held in Thomas v. Attorney General of the United 
States in 2010 that when the record of conviction is inconclusive as to under which version of a di-
visible statute a respondent was convicted, the conviction could not be categorized as an aggravated 
felony and therefore the respondent was not barred from applying for cancellation of removal. 625 
F.3d at 147. In 2014 in Syblis v. Attorney General of the United States, however, the Third Circuit 
held that where a circumstance-specific inquiry is required, the respondent bears the burden of prov-
ing that the facts of a prior conviction do not bar eligibility for relief. 763 F.3d at 357. Several circuits 
have recognized that in determining whether a past crime bars an applicant from eligibility for relief, 
categorical inquiries do not require that a respondent affirmatively prove that a conviction is not an 
immigration offense by presenting evidence outside the inclusive record of conviction. See Sauceda v. 
Lynch, 819 F.3d 526, 532 (1st Cir. 2016) (domestic violence); Almanza-Arenas v. Lynch, 815 F.3d 
469, 488–89 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (Watford, J., concurring) (theft and unlawful driving); Martinez 
v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 113, 121–22 (2d Cir. 2008) (distribution of marijuana). Circumstance-specific 
inquiries, however, involve questions of fact and therefore the respondent bears the burden of proving 
eligibility for the relief sought. Compare Syblis, 763 F.3d at 357 (placing the burden on the respond-
ent to prove that the circumstances of his crime did not align with the offense listed in the INA where 
the record of conviction was inconclusive), with Thomas, 625 F.3d at 147 (applying the modified 
categorical approach and holding that where the record of conviction was inconclusive, the respondent 
had met his burden of proving that his conviction did not trigger immigration consequences). 
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lowing immigration adjudicators to examine the facts underlying a respond-
ent’s past criminal conviction, the Fourth Circuit failed to sufficiently address 
the categorical approach’s long historic application in determining immigration 
consequences of criminal convictions and the value this analytic tool provides 
in a system that heavily disadvantages immigrants convicted of crimes. Fur-
thermore, in failing to set limits on the evidence that may be considered in cir-
cumstance-specific inquiries, the Fourth Circuit enabled adjudicators to con-
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